The idea of a language of description is explicitly proposed by Bernstein in Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity (1996). However, the notion is implicit (at least) in all of his work and much of that with which he has been directly associated since the 1960s. Bernstein introduces the concept as follows:

Briefly, a language of description is a translation device whereby one language is transformed into another. We can distinguish between internal and external languages of description. The internal language of description refers to the syntax whereby a conceptual language is created. The external language of description refers to the syntax whereby the internal language can describe something other than itself.
(Bernstein, 1996; pp. 135-6)

The nature of and relationship between internal and external languages of description provides the basis for the interrogation of research. This is far more sophisticated than a simple consideration of concepts and indicators. Bernstein clearly places the emphasis on relational structures at both levels. The internal language produces theoretical descriptions. The external language is derived from the internal language in such a way that the former can facilitate the production of a description of an empirical setting. This is not to say, however, that Bernstein is advocating theoreticism. The internal language must also develop and this will come about via the dialogic relationship between the external and internal descriptions and via the constitution of the external description as:

... an interpretative surface, or the means of dialogue between the agency of enactments and the generating of the internal language of the model.
(ibid; p. 138)

Here, Bernstein is concerned to give space for the voice of the researched to announce the specificity of its text, enabling the internal language to develop empirically. Clearly, the internal language can also be developed in terms of its own internal consistency and in dialogue with other languages of description.

The language that I am introducing in this book is clearly indebted to Bernstein’s work. Nevertheless, there are significant divergences between his position and mine. Some of these have been described in the [Chapter 5 and see also Dowling 1999]. Many of these differences are at the level of general methodology, which is to say, they relate to the theoretical propositions derived in the [Chapter 5] and, indeed, to epistemological assumptions that frame these propositions. [...] Here I wish to refer to a pragmatic distinction, viz the specific form of the development of my language has not incorporated a clear distinction between its internal and its external systems. In part, this is because much of this development took place before the chapter of Bernstein’s book from which the above extracts are taken was written .

This is not to say that Bernstein’s analysis cannot be applied to my language in order to resolve it into external and internal components. This certainly could be achieved and such an achievement could constitute a reading of my language into Bernstein’s metalanguage, that is, an evaluation of my language according to the principles of another. Since my current project is to assert the positivity of my own language, such an evaluation is not my immediate concern. On the other hand, it is appropriate to recontextualise Bernstein’s conception with respect to the current development of my general methodological framework. I shall attempt this by addressing a general question concerning the relationship between the theoretical structures that I have developed and the empirical claims that are being or which might be made.

(Dowling, 1998; pp. 124-5)